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Abstract
We report the results from an experiment designed explicitly to study the Markov
Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) dynamics of free riding behavior in the accumulation of a
durable public good. We consider two cases: economies with reversibility (RIE), where
the agents can either increase or decrease the accumulated stock; and economies with
irreversibility (IIE), where contributions are non-negative. Our findings support the key
qualitative prediction of MPE: IIE converges to an accumulated level of public good that
is an order of magnitude higher than RIE. We also find that the accumulation path is
inefficiently slow in both RIE and IIE, and the public good is significantly under-provided.
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1 Introduction
There is a vast literature addressing questions related to the provision of public goods
in static environments. This includes hundreds of theoretical papers in the lineage initi-
ated by Samuelson’s (1954) seminal paper, presaged by the classical treatises on public
finance by Wicksell and Lindahl.1 It also includes hundreds of experimental papers
based on one variation or another of Samuelson’s theoretical model (Ledyard 1995).
The typical motivating examples are national defense, public health, transportation
infrastructure, pollution abatement, and so forth. What is striking is that essentially
all economically important examples are public goods that take years to accumulate,
provide streams of benefits over the long term, and require ongoing expenditures in
order to improve or even maintain their levels. In other words, most public goods one
can think of are durable goods and hence dynamics are an important component of their
provision. In spite of this, remarkably little research has addressed the durable public
goods problem from a dynamic perspective, either in the theoretical and experimental
literatures.
We are mainly interested in three questions: How serious is free riding in the pro-
vision of durable public goods? What new issues emerge from the dynamic nature of
the investment process? How do the answers to these questions depend on the degree
to which investment decisions are reversible over time?
Dynamic free-rider problems differ from static in subtle but important ways. In
dynamic environments, we not only have the familiar free rider problem present in static
public good provision, but also present is a second dynamic free rider phenomenon that
further erodes incentives for efficient provision. In these games, strategies depend on
the accumulated level of the public good, the state variable of the game: an increase
in current investment by one agent typically triggers a reduction in future investment
by all agents, in what is essentially a dynamic crowding-out effect. Such dynamic
crowding out is especially severe if agents coordinate on stationary equilibria where
strategies depend only on the accumulated level of the public good. On the other hand,
the infinite horizon of the game generates a plethora of non-stationary equilibria that
provide strategic opportunities to endogenously support cooperative outcomes using
carrot-and-stick strategies. In principle, this could completely overcome both the static
and the dynamic free rider problems. Thus, it is an open empirical question whether
or not the free rider problem is exacerbated or ameliorated in the case of dynamic
provision of durable public goods, as compared to one-shot public goods problems.
Dynamic free-rider problems, moreover, offer a number of economically important
1An excellent account of the development of the theory of public goods is Silvestre (2003).
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predictions that cannot be assessed (or even stated) with static frameworks because
they depend on the durability of the public good. First, regarding the storage tech-
nology, a public good is reversible if players can either increase it or decrease it trans-
forming it back to private consumption; a public good is irreversible, if players cannot
decrease it. Most investments are partially reversible, and the degree (or cost) of re-
versibility varies widely.2 What is the effect of irreversibility on contributions? Second,
regarding the accumulation process, how are investment strategies going to depend on
the state variable? If players use the state as a reference point, then the steady state
may depend on the investments in the first periods: a good start with over-investment
(compared to the equilibrium level) may induce a permanent increase in the steady
state. If agents instead are anchored to a given equilibrium steady state target, then
players should be expected to correct “anomalous” contributions: over-investment in
the early periods should be corrected with underinvestment later on.
In this work, we make a first attempt to answer the questions raised above by
studying the theoretical predictions of a simple dynamic public good game in a lab-
oratory experiment. The economy we study has n individuals. In each period, each
individual is endowed with w units of input that can be allocated between personal
consumption and contribution to the stock of durable public good. Utility is linear in
consumption of the private good and concave in the accumulated stock of the durable
public good. Total payoffs for a player in the game are the discounted sum of utility
over an infinite horizon of the game, where the discount factor is δ. We characterize
the efficient accumulation path as a function of w, n, and δ.3 We study the Markov
perfect equilibria of the game under two different assumptions about reversibility: full
reversibility and irreversibility. We prove that investment is always higher in the ir-
reversible case. We analyze the best subgame perfect equilibrium (a solution concept
often used in applied work) of the two models and prove that the optimal investment
strategies can be supported as an equilibrium with reversible investment but not with
irreversible investment. The comparative static predictions implied by the two equi-
librium concepts are completely opposed with respect to the effect of reversibility on
2For example, the art collection at the Louvre, which took centuries to accumulate, could be sold
off to private collectors and the proceeds distributed as transfer payments to the citizens of France.
Cobblestone roads have been dug up and the stones used to build private dwellings. Military vehicles
and aircraft can be (and have been) privatized and converted to civilian use. Publicly owned open space,
even with conservation easements, are routinely converted to the private development of shopping malls,
ski resorts, or new residential communities. Decades of sustainable management of fisheries, forests or
other re-plenishable resources can be rapidly reversed by over-harvesting or poaching.
3To keep the experimental design simple, there is no depreciation, so at time t the stock of the public
good is simply the sum of individual investments across all periods up to time t. Battaglini, Nunnari,
and Palfrey (Forthcoming) also characterize the efficient path and the equilibrium accumulation paths
for arbitrary depreciation rates, d ∈ [0, 1].
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investment: the Markov equilibrium predicts higher investments in a irreversible econ-
omy, the most efficient subgame perfect equilibrium the opposite. These contrasting
theoretical predictions are the basis for the main treatment in our experiment: re-
versibility vs. irreversibility. We also have a secondary treatment dimension, which
is the number of individuals in the game: we compare n = 3 and n = 5. Thus, the
experiment has four different treatments depending on n and whether investments are
reversible.
The main comparative static prediction of the model is that in a Markov equilib-
rium there should be greater contributions and a higher equilibrium steady state level of
public good in the irreversible investment economy (IIE) than in the reversible invest-
ment economy (RIE). In contrast, the model predicts no significant difference in public
good levels as a function of n. The data are consistent with these predicted treatment
effects (or non-effects, with respect to n): both in RIE and IIE the accumulation path is
inefficiently slow and the public good under-provided; IIE induces significantly higher
public good contributions than RIE; and public good accumulation does not seem to
be significantly affected by n. We do, however, observe some differences between the
finer details of the theoretical predictions and the data, mainly with respect to the
path of convergence to the steady state and individual investment strategies. In equi-
librium, convergence should be monotonic. That is, the stock of public good should
gradually increase over time until the steady state is reached after which investment
is zero. Instead, there is a tendency for initial over-investment in the early periods,
compared to the equilibrium investment levels. In the treatment with reversibility, this
is followed by a significant reversal, i.e., negative investment, with the stock of public
good gradually declining in the direction of the equilibrium steady state. After several
periods of play, the stock of the public good is very close to the Markov equilibrium
of the game. When disinvestment is not feasible, investment steadily decreases but it
remains positive and the long run level of the public good is significantly above the
equilibrium steady state.
In addition to the experiments described above, we propose a new methodology
to test for Markovian behavior in equilibrium. The idea of the new experimental
test consists in designing a one-period experiment where subjects’ payoffs from the
public good are given by the equilibrium value function of the unique concave Markov
perfect equilibrium of the game with reversibility. In this reduced-form version of
the game, the individual incentives to contribute in the public good are exactly the
same as in the fully dynamic game (under the assumption that subjects condition
their strategies only on the public good stock), but there is no possibility to sustain
a higher public good outcome through the non-stationary strategies that can arise
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in a repeated game. We observe no systematic difference in contributions between
this reduced form of the dynamic game and the fully dynamic game. We conclude that
observed behavior in the dynamic game with reversible investment is well approximated
by the predictions of a purely forward looking Markov equilibrium, rather than by
an equilibrium in which agents use more complicated history-dependent strategies to
punish uncooperative behavior or reciprocate cooperative behavior by other members
of the group.
Our work is related to three distinct strands of research. First, naturally, the exper-
imental literature on public good provision in static environments. This literature has
explored voluntary contributions under a variety of conditions. The early experiments
focused primarily on free riding in environments where there was a dominant strategy
for all individuals to contribute zero to the public good. Variations on these early dom-
inant strategy public goods games have been conducted in the laboratory under many
different assumptions about utility functions and technology, different subject pools,
asymmetric endowments and preferences, different information conditions, different
public good mechanisms, variable group sizes, and so forth. Many of these variations
are discussed at length in Ledyard’s (1995) comprehensive survey of the seminal work
in this area.4 The dynamic environment we study is fundamentally different from the
static environments studied in these papers. We have already mentioned some of these
important differences and will discuss this issue in greater detail in Section 5, in the
context of the results from our experiment.
The second literature to which our work is related consists in the work on sequential
mechanisms for the provision of static public goods. Although in this literature play-
ers play a dynamic game, the purpose of the game is the determination of a one-shot
provision of a discrete public good (Harrison and Hirschleifer 1989; Dorsey 1992; Duffy,
Ochs, and Vesterlund 2007; Cho, Gale and Kariv 2008; Diev and Hichri 2008; Noussair
and Soo 2008; Cho, Gale, Kariv, and Palfrey 2011).5 In the contribution games stud-
ied in these papers, agents have the opportunity to revise their initial contributions
over time, and observe the cumulative level of contributions at each moment. Con-
trary to our setup, the public good does not provide any benefit until the game ends.
Moreover, when payoffs from the public good are a continuous function of cumulative
contributions, the unique equilibrium of these mechanisms is not different from the cor-
responding one-shot games (that is, no contribution). Only when a certain threshold
guarantees a discrete benefit, agents might achieve the provision of this discrete public
4See Chaudhuri (2011) and Vesterlund (2012) for more recent (and more selective) surveys.
5There are also public goods voluntary contribution experiments with reduced-form one-shot payoff
functions that are motivated by common pool resource problems. See Ostrom (1999) for a survey.
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good, through history-dependent trigger strategies.
Finally, our work is related to the emerging experimental literature on dynamic
stochastic games in which a state variable provides a strategic link across periods.
Early contributions are Lei and Noussair (2002) and Noussair and Matheny (2000)
who experimentally study single agent dynamic optimization problems. Herr et al.
(1997) present a model of resource utilization in a finitely repeated environment in
which players’ actions have externalities on the preferences of current and future play-
ers. Battaglini and Palfrey (2012b) test a dynamic model of pure redistribution (in
which the state variable is the status quo distribution of resources and the amount of
resources is constant over time). Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey (2012b) study the
effect on investments of voting rules in a model of public good accumulation in which
investment is chosen through a non-cooperative bargaining process. To our knowledge
Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey (2009) is the first paper to present an experimental
study of a dynamic public good game in which players make voluntary contributions.
The results of this working paper are now incorporated in our current paper.6 Follow-
ing this paper, Vespa (2012) has provided an alternative test of Markovian behavior in
a game of resource exploitation similar to Herr et al. (1997).7 The results of this paper
confirm our finding that the Markov equilibrium is a good model of behavior in the
laboratory. Interestingly, however, Vespa observes that the feasibility of cooperation
with non-stationary strategies may depend on the complexity of the action space: co-
operation may be possible with two actions, but not possible already with three. This
may suggest that the Markov equilibrium can do well in environments like ours (with
a continuum of actions) because players find it difficult to deal with non stationary
strategies when the action space is non trivial.
From a theoretical point of view, our work draws on Battaglini Nunnari and Palfrey
(Forthcoming) who first characterized the equilibrium in the dynamic public good game
that we study with and without reversibility.8 In our paper we use the characteriza-
6In Battaglini Nunnari and Palfrey (2009) we studied voluntary contribution only in the reversible
case. The results presented in this working paper are now incorporated in the current expanded paper
that includes also the irreversible case.
7Related experiments are presented by Saijo et al. (2009), who focus on an environment with
static, state independent strategies, and Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin (2012), who focus on the effect
of environmental context and termination uncertainty. The theoretical framework and experimental
design of these papers do not allow to investigate the effect of irreversibility on actions.
8Previously, work on the reversible case was done in a framework of a linear differentiable game
with quadratic preferences (Fershtman, C. and S. Nitzan 1991 and Duckner and Long 1993 among
others). Contribution games with irreversibility are studied in the literature on monotone games, see
Matthews (2012) (and the references cited there) for a recent comprehensive analysis. These works
however assume the players have a dominant strategy and it can be applied only to special cases that
do not include our environment.
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tion presented there as a basic prediction for the players’ behavior in the laboratory,
integrating it with an analysis of other non stationary equilibria for completeness.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
model and its solutions: the first best solution, the equilibrium when the public good
is reversible, the equilibrium when the public good is irreversible and the equilibrium
predictions with non-stationary subgame perfect equilibria. In Section 3 we describe
the experimental design. Section 4 discusses the results of the experiment. Sec-
tion 5 compares the results in our dynamic environment with the results of previous
experiments on static public good games. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Here we describe a simplified version of the model in Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey
(2012a, Forthcoming), which we will use in our experimental design. Consider an
economy with n agents who interact for an infinite number of periods. There are two
goods: a private good x and a public good g. The level of consumption of the private
good by agent i in period t is xit, the level of the public good in period t is gt. The
utility U j of agent j can be written as:
U j =
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
xjt + α
√
gt
]
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is a common discount factor, and α > 0 is a constant. The private
consumption good is nondurable, the public good is durable and does not depreciate
between periods. Thus, if the level of public good at time t − 1 is gt−1 and the total
investment in the public good is It, then the level of public good at time t will be
gt = gt−1 + It.
It is convenient to distinguish the state variable at t, gt−1, from the policy choice
gt. In the remainder, we denote yt = gt−1 + It as the new level of public good after
an investment It when the last period’s level of the public good is gt−1. The initial
stock of public good is g0 ≥ 0, exogenously given. Public policies are chosen as in the
classic free rider problem. In each period, each agent j is endowed with w = W/n
units of private good and chooses on its own how to allocate its endowment between
an individual investment in the public good (which is shared by all agents) and private
consumption, taking as given the strategies of the other agents. The key difference with
respect to the static free rider problem is that the public good can be accumulated over
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time. The level of the state variable g, therefore, creates a dynamic linkage across
policy making periods.
We consider two alternative economic environments. In a Reversible Investment
Economy (RIE), the level of individual investment can be negative, with the constraint
that ijt ∈ [−gt/n,W/n] ∀j, where ijt = W/n− xjt is the investment by agent j.9 In an
Irreversible Investment Economy (IIE), an agent’s investment cannot be negative and
must satisfy ijt ∈ [0,W/n] ∀j.
The RIE corresponds to a situation in which the public investment can be scaled
back in the future at no cost. An example can be an art collection or land for common
use. The IIE corresponds to situations in which once the investment is done it cannot be
undone. This seems the appropriate case for investments in public infrastructure (for
example, a bridge or a road), the level of global warming, or less tangible investments
like “social capital.”. In this environment, private consumption cannot be negative and
the total economy-wide investment in the public good in any period is given by the
sum of the agent investments.
2.1 The Planner’s Solution
As a benchmark with which to compare the equilibrium allocations, we first analyze
the sequence of public policies that would be chosen by a benevolent planner who
maximizes the sum of utilities of the agents. This is the welfare optimum because the
private good enters linearly in each agent’s utility function.
Denote the planner’s policy as yP (g) and consider first an economy with reversible
investment. As shown by Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (Forthcoming), the objective
function of the planner is continuous, strictly concave and differentiable and a solution
of its maximization problem exists and is unique. The optimal policies have an intuitive
characterization. When the accumulated level of public good is low, the marginal
benefit of investing in g is high, and the planner finds it optimal to invest as much as
possible: in this case yP (g) = W + g and
∑n
j=1 x
i = 0. When g is high, the planner
will be able to reach the level of public good y∗P that solves the planner’s unconstrained
problem:
y∗P =
(
αn
2(1− δ)
)2
(1)
The investment function, therefore, has the following simple structure. For g < y∗P−W ,
y∗P is not feasible: the planner invests everything and yP (g) = g+W . For g ≥ y∗P −W ,
9This constraint guarantees that (out of equilibrium) the sum of reductions in g can not be larger
than the stock of g. The analysis would be similar if we allow each agent to withdraw up to g. In this
case, however, we would have to assume a rationing rule in case the individuals withdraw more than g.
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instead, investment stops at yP (g) = y∗P . This investment function implies that the
planner’s economy converges to the steady state yoP = y∗P . In this steady state, without
loss of generality, we can set xi(g) = (W + g − y(g)) /n ∀i.10
The planner’s optimum for the IIE case is not very much different. The planner
finds it optimal to invest all resources for g ≤ y∗P −W . For g ∈ (y∗P −W, y∗P ), the
planner finds it optimal to stop investing at y∗P , as before. For g ≥ y∗P , y∗P is not
feasible, so it is optimal to invest 0, and to set yP (g) = g This difference in the
investment function for IIE, however, is essentially irrelevant for the optimal path and
the steady state of the economy. Starting from any g0 lower than the steady state
y∗P , levels of g larger or equal than y∗P are impossible to reach, and the irreversibility
constraint does not affect the optimal investment path.
2.2 Reversible Investment Economies
We first describe equilibrium behavior when the investment in the public good is re-
versible. We focus on continuous, symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria, where all agents
use the same strategy, and these strategies are time-independent functions of the state,
g. A strategy is a pair (x(·), i(·)): where x(g) is an agent’s level of consumption and
i(g) is an agent’s level of investment in the public good in state g. Associated with any
equilibrium is a value function vR(g) which specifies the expected discounted future
payoff to an agent when the state is g. The optimization problem for agent j if the
current level of public good is g, the agent’s value function is vR(g), and other agents’
investment strategies are given by xR(g), can be represented as:
max
y,x

x+ α√g + δvR(y)
s.t x+ y − g = W − (n− 1)xR(g)
W − (n− 1)xR(g) + g − y ≥ 0
x ≤ g/n+W/n

(2)
Contrary to the planner, agent j cannot choose y directly: it chooses only its level
of private consumption and the level of its own contribution to the public investment.
The agent, however realizes that given the other agents’ level of private consumption
(n − 1)xR(g), his/her investment ultimately determines y. It is therefore as if agent
j chooses x and y, provided that he satisfies the feasibility constraints. The first
constraint is the resource constraint: it requires that total resources, W , are equal to
the sum of private consumption, (n − 1)xR(g) + x, plus the public investment, y − g.
The second constraint requires that private consumption x is non negative. The third
10Indeed, the planner is indifferent regarding the distribution of private consumption.
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constraint requires that no agent can reduce y by more than his share g/n.
In a symmetric equilibrium, all agents consume the same fraction of resources, so
agent j takes as given that in state g the other agents each consume:
xR(g) =
W + g − yR(g)
n
,
where yR(g) is the equilibrium level of investment in state g. Substituting the first
constraint of (2) in the objective function, recognizing that agent j takes the strategies
of the other agents as given, and ignoring irrelevant constants, the agent’s problem can
be written as:
max
y
{
α
√
y − y + δvR(y)
y ≤ W+gn + n−1n yR(g), y ≥ n−1n yR(g)
}
(3)
where it should be noted that agent j takes yR(g) as given.11 The objective function
shows that an agent has a clear trade off: a dollar in investment produces a marginal
benefit α2√g + δv′R(y), the marginal cost is −1, a dollar less in private consumption.
The first constraint shows that at the maximum the agent can increase the investment
of the other players (i.e., n−1n yR(g)) by
W+g
n . The second constraint makes clear that
at most the agent can consume his endowment W/n and his share of g, g/n.
We restrict attention to equilibria in which the objective function in (3) is strictly
concave, and we refer to these equilibria as concave equilibria. Depending on the state
g, the solution of (3) falls in one of two cases: the first case corresponds to the situation
where the first constraint in (3) is binding, so all resources are devoted to investment in
the public good. In this case, xR(g) = 0, yR(g) = W +g, and investment by each agent
is iR(g) = Wn . In the second case, private consumption is positive, that is xR(g) > 0,
and the solution is characterized by a unique public good level y∗R =
(
αn
2(n−δ)
)2
. In this
second case, the investment by each agent is equal to iR(g) = 1n [y∗R − g] and per capita
private consumption is xR(g) =
W+g−y∗R
n > 0. The first case is possible if and only if
W ≤ y∗R−gR, that is, if g is below some threshold gR defined by: gR = max {y∗R −W, 0}.
We summarize this in the following proposition, which also proves the existence of an
equilibrium and its uniqueness when vR(g) is strictly concave:
Proposition 1. In the game with reversible investment, a strictly concave equilib-
rium exists and it is unique. In this equilibrium, public investment is: yR(g) =
min {W + g, y∗R} where y∗R =
(
αn
2(n−δ)
)2
< y∗P .
Proof. See Appendix A.
11Since yR(g) is the equilibrium level of investment, in a symmetric equilibrium (n − 1)yR(g)/n is
the level of investment that agent j expects from all the other agents, and that he/she takes as given
in equilibrium.
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The public good function yR(g) is qualitatively similar to the corresponding plan-
ner’s function yP (g). The main difference is that y∗R < y∗P and gR < gP , so public
good provision is typically smaller (and always smaller in the steady state). This is a
dynamic version of the usual free rider problem associated with public good provision:
each agent invests less than is socially optimal because he/she fails to fully internalize
all agents’ utilities. Part of the free rider problem can be seen from (3): in choos-
ing investment, agents count only their marginal benefit, u′(y) + δv′R(y), rather than
nu′(y) + δnv′R(y), but all the marginal costs (−1). In this dynamic model, however,
there is an additional effect that reduces incentives to invest, called the dynamic free
rider problem. A marginal increase in g has two effects. An immediate effect, corre-
sponding to the increase in resources available in the following period: g. But there is
also a delayed effect on next period’s investment: the increase in g triggers a reduction
in the future investment of all the other agents through an increase in xR(g): for any
level of g > gR, yR(g) will be kept at y∗R. In a symmetric equilibrium, if agent j in-
creases the investment by 1 dollar, he will trigger a reduction in future investment by
all agents by 1/n dollars; the net value of the increase in g for j will be only δ/n.
2.3 Irreversible Investment Economies
When the stock of the public good cannot be reduced, the optimization problem of an
agent can be written like (2), but with an additional constraint: the individual level
of investment cannot be negative or, in other words, each agent’s private consumption
cannot exceed his endowment, xi(g) ≤W/n. Following similar steps as before, we can
write the maximization problem faced by an agent as:
max
y
{
α
√
y − y + δvIR(y)
y ≤ W+gn + n−1n yIR(g), y ≥ g + n−1n (yIR(g)− g)
}
(4)
where the only difference with respect to (3) is the second constraint: the new level of
public good cannot be lower than g plus the investments from all the other agents.
As pointed out in Section 2.1, when public investments are efficient, irreversibility
is irrelevant for the equilibrium allocation. The investment path chosen by the planner
is unaffected because the planner’s choice is time consistent: he never finds it optimal
to increase g if he plans to reduce it later. In the concave equilibrium characterized
in the previous section, the investment function may be inefficient, but it is weakly
increasing in the state. Agents invest until they reach a steady state, and then they
stop. It may seem intuitive, therefore, that irreversibility is irrelevant in this case
too, but this intuition is not correct. To the contrary, irreversibility destroys the con-
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cave equilibrium we characterized for reversible investment economies and induces the
agents to significantly increase their investment, leading to a significantly higher unique
steady state. Intuitively, the reason is that the agents no longer have to worry about
the dynamic free rider problem: the irreversibility constraint creates a “commitment
device” for the future; the agents know that g cannot be reduced by the others (or
their future selves).
Proposition 2. In an economy with irreversible investment, a weakly concave equi-
librium exists. Any weakly concave equilibrium, moreover, is associated to the same
unique steady state equal to y∗IR =
(
α
2(1−δ)
)2
. This steady state level is strictly greater
than y∗R and strictly smaller than y∗P for any n > 1 and any δ ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The first part of Proposition 2 follows directly as a special case of Propositions
1 in Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (Forthcoming), where it is established that the
dynamic free rider game with irreversibility admits an equilibrium with standard con-
cavity properties. The second part, uniqueness of the steady state, is established in
Appendix A. In this steady state, the public good stock is strictly smaller than the one
accumulated by a benevolent planner, but strictly higher than the one accumulated in
the unique concave equilibrium of RIE. This steady state, y∗IR =
(
α
2(1−δ)
)2
, is exactly
the same level that an agent alone would accumulate and it is independent of n.
The equilibrium selection based on Markov strategies therefore leads to a clear pre-
diction that the irreversibility of investment will generate a higher level of investment
in each period, as well as a higher steady state of the public good. The intuition for this
is straightforward: the impossibility to convert today’s investment back into private
consumption at a future dates, eliminates worries about future agents’ incentives to
plunder the current public good investments. In other words, irreversibility mitigates
the dynamic free rider problem. Moreover, the investment function in the equilibrium
described in Proposition 2 is different than the one for the reversible investment case,
where the agents would either find it optimal to invest everything, or just enough to
reach the steady state. In contrast, in the irreversible investment case, the invest-
ment function increases gradually over time12, and the steady state is reached only
asymptotically.
12This property of gradually increasing contributions in our model is reminiscent of a property of
the repeated game equilibria found elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, Marx and Matthews
2010), but the intuition behind it is quite different. Here gradualism is needed in order to smooth out
the value function of the Markov equilibrium at the steady state, while elsewhere gradualism follows
from the non-Markov repeated game strategies that are used to enforce efficient equilibria.
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2.4 Cooperation Using Non-Stationary Strategies
We have restricted our attention to symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. However,
the voluntary contribution game we study is an infinite horizon dynamic game with
many subgame perfect equilibria. The Markovian assumption of stationary strategies
is very restrictive and it is possible that some other equilibria can sustain more efficient
outcomes through the use of history-dependent strategies that use punishments and
rewards for past actions. As we show below, in economies with reversible investment,
the optimal solution can indeed be supported as the outcome of a subgame perfect
equilibrium:
Proposition 3. There is a δ̂R ∈ [0, 1) such that, for all δ > δ̂R, the efficient invest-
ment path characterized by the optimal solution is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
of the voluntary contribution game with reversible investment.
In Appendix A, we derive non-stationary strategies for the voluntary contribution
game with reversible investment whose outcome is the efficient level of public good
(the optimal solution), and show that these strategies are a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.13
The strategy for each agent is to allocate the optimal level of investment to public
good production, (y∗P (g) − g)/n, and to consume the remainder. A deviation from
this investment behavior by any agent is punished by reversion to the unique concave
Markov perfect equilibrium characterized in Section 2.2. This is a simple strategy that
involves the harshest individually rational punishment for deviation from cooperation:
whenever g > y∗R and a deviation is observed, the public good will revert to y∗R and it
will stay at this level for all future periods.
When investment is irreversible, the efficient outcome cannot be sustained with
strategies similar to the ones proposed above for environments with reversible invest-
ment. Matthews (2013) shows that, with discounting, no subgame perfect equilibrium
of a general family of dynamic contribution games is efficient, in the sense of supporting
the optimal public good stock in each period. In particular, that result applies to our
environment, implying the following proposition as corollary.
Proposition 4. There is no δ̂IR ∈ [0, 1) such that, for all δ > δ̂IR the optimal
investment strategies are a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the voluntary contri-
bution game with irreversible investment.
13Our goal is to show that the optimal solution is the outcome of some subgame perfect Nash
equilibria of the game. We do not claim that the strategies proposed in the proof of Proposition 3 are
the best punishment schemes, and there may be different non-stationary strategies that work for lower
δ.
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The intuition behind Proposition 4 is that the potential for punishment is signifi-
cantly dampened by the irreversibility constraint. Whenever g > y∗IR and a deviation is
observed, agents cannot disinvest down to y∗IR and the harshest punishment is charac-
terized by no investment and a constant stock in all periods following the first deviation.
Since many equilibria generally exist, a refinement is always needed for comparative
statics or policy evaluation. It is standard practice in applied work to use as solution
concept the most efficient subgame perfect equilibrium (in our model the solution with
the highest investment in g). The propositions presented above are important because
they allow us to cleanly separate the time path of investment behavior implied by the
Markov equilibrium discussed in the previous section from the time path of investment
behavior in the best subgame perfect (non-Markov) equilibrium. Let gM,Rt and g
M,IR
t
denote the equilibrium stock of accumulated public good at time t in the Markov equi-
libria discussed in the previous section with reversibility and irreversibility, respectively.
Let gS,Rt and g
S,IR
t corresponding stock of accumulated public good observable at time
t in the best subgame perfect equilibrium. We have:
Corollary 1. There is a δ∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that, for δ > δ∗ we have:
• gM,Rt < gM,IRt on the equilibrium path.
• gS,IRt ≤ gS,Rt on the equilibrium path.
The first bullet point can be established using Propositions 1 and 2, while the second
bullet point follows from Propositions 3 and 4. Corollary 1 establishes that the com-
parative static predictions implied by the two different equilibrium concepts (Markov
vs. best SPE) are completely opposed with respect to the effect of reversibility vs.
irreversibility on investment. This theoretical insight thus provides two starkly oppo-
site predictions about efficiency that will be useful for interpreting the results of the
experiment.
3 Experimental Design
The experiments were all conducted at the Social Science Experimental Laboratory
(SSEL) using students from the California Institute of Technology. Subjects were
recruited from a pool of volunteer subjects, maintained by SSEL. Eight sessions were
run, using a total of 105 subjects. No subject participated in more than one session.
Half of the sessions were for Reversible Investment Economies and half for Irreversible
Investment Economies. Half were conducted using 3 person groups, and half with 5
person groups. In all sessions the discount factor was δ = 0.75, and the multiplier of
13
the current-period payoff from the public good was α = 4, that is, u(g) = 4
√
(g). In
the 3 person groups, we used the parameters W = 60, while in the 5 person groups
W = 80. It is useful to emphasize that, as proven in the previous sections, given
these parameters the steady state is uniquely defined both for the RIE and IIE game
and for all treatments: so the theoretical predictions of the convergence value of g is
independent of the choice of equilibrium.
Discounted payoffs were induced by a random termination rule by rolling a die after
each period in front of the room, with the outcome determining whether the game
continued to another period (with probability .75) or was terminated (with probability
.25). The n = 5 sessions were conducted with 15 subjects, divided into 3 groups of
5 members each. The n = 3 sessions were conducted with 12 subjects, divided into
4 groups of 3 members each.14 Groups stayed the same throughout the periods of a
given match, and subjects were randomly rematched into groups between matches. A
match consisted of one multi-period play of the game which continued until one of the
die rolls eventually ended the match. As a result, different matches lasted for different
lengths (that is, for a different number of periods). Table 1 summarizes the design and
the theoretical properties of the equilibrium for the four treatments.
.
Treatment n W Groups Subjects y∗MPE y∗P
RIE 3 60 70 21 7.11 576
RIE 5 80 60 30 5.54 1600
IIE 3 60 80 24 64 576
IIE 5 80 60 30 64 1600
Table 1: Experimental design, equilibrium and planner steady states
Before the first match, instructions15 were read aloud, followed by a practice match
and a comprehension quiz to verify that subjects understood the details of the environ-
ment including how to compute payoffs. The current period’s payoffs from the public
good stock (called project size in the experiment) was displayed graphically, with stock
of public good on the horizontal axis and the payoff on the vertical axis. Subjects could
click anywhere on the curve and the payoff for that level of public good appeared on
the screen. Subjects received information about the total investment in the public good
as well as about the individual investments of other subjects in their group, at the end
of each period.
14One of the N = 3 sessions used 9 subjects.
15Sample instructions are reported in Appendix C. Subject decisions, interactions, and feedback
were implemented in a computer network using the open source interactive game software, Multistage
(http://software.ssel.caltech.edu/).
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At the end of the last match each subject was paid privately in cash the sum of
his or her earnings over all matches plus a show-up fee of $10. Earnings ranged from
approximately $20 to $50, with sessions lasting between one and two hours. There was
considerable range in the earnings and length across sessions because of the random
stopping rule.
4 Experimental Results
In this Section, we present results for three-members groups and focus on the com-
parison between reversible and irreversible investment. We later discuss results for
five-members groups and show that, as predicted by the theory, public good accu-
mulation and individual investment behavior are not significantly affected by group
size.
4.1 Public Good Outcomes
We start the analysis of the experimental results by looking at the long-run stock of
public good by treatment. We consider as the long-run stock of public good, the stock
reached by a group after 10 periods of play.16 Table 2 compares the theoretical and
observed levels of public good by treatment. In order to aggregate across groups, we use
the median level of the public good from all groups in a given treatment at period 10
(y10mdn). Similar results hold if we use the mean or other measures of central tendency.17
We compare this to the stock predicted by the Markov perfect equilibrium of the game
after 10 periods (y10MP ), and to the stock accumulated in the optimal solution after 10
periods (y10P ).
.
Treatment n y10mdn y10MP y10P
Reversible Investment (RIE) 3 10.0 7.11 576
Irreversible Investment (IIE) 3 293.5 43.64 576
Table 2: Long-run stock of public good, theory vs. results
16In the experiment, the length of a match is stochastic and determined by the roll of a die. No
match lasted longer than 17 periods and we have very few observations for periods 11-17.
17In Appendix B, we report averages, medians and standard errors of the stock of the public good
by period for each treatment. The statistical tests in the remainder of this section compare average
stocks between different treatments using t-tests and their underlying distributions using Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney tests.
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Figure 1: Time path of stock relative to MPE and Planner.
How do groups get to these stocks of public good? Figure 2 gives us a richer picture,
showing the time series of the stock of public good by treatment.18 The horizontal axis
is the time period and the vertical axis is the stock of the public good. As in Table
2, we use the median level of the public good from all groups in a given treatment.19
Superimposed on the graphs are the theoretical time paths corresponding to the Markov
perfect equilibria (represented with dashed lines) and to the optimal solution.
Table 2, Figure 1 and Figure 2 exhibit several systematic regularities, which we
discuss below in comparison with the theoretical time paths.
FINDING 1. Irreversible investment leads to higher public good pro-
duction than reversible investment. According to t-tests and Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney tests20, the average stock of public good is significantly lower in RIE than in
18These and subsequent figures show data from the first ten periods. Data from later periods (11-13
for RIE and 11-17 for IIE) are excluded from the graphs because there were so few observations. The
data from later periods are reported in Appendix B and included in all the statistical analyses.
19Figure 1, by showing the median time path of the stock of public good, masks some of this hetero-
geneity. Figure 5, reported in Appendix B, illustrates the variation across groups by representing, for
each period, the first, second and third quartile of investment levels for each treatment. Figure 5 shows
that there was remarkable consistency across groups, especially considering this was a complicated
infinitely repeated game with many non-Markov equilibria.
20The p-values associated with these tests are reported in the Appendix B. The null hypothesis of a
t-test is that the averages in the two samples are the same. The null hypothesis of a Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test is that the underlying distributions of the two samples are the same. We are treating as
unit of observation a single group.
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IIE in every single period for both group sizes. This difference is statistically significant
at the 1% level (p < 0.01) for periods 1-10 for both group sizes. Not only are the dif-
ferences statistically significant, but they are large in magnitude. The median stock of
public good is around six times greater in the IIE treatment than in the RIE treatment,
averaged across all periods for which we have data (177 in IIE vs. 29 in RIE). The
difference between the two treatments is relatively small in the initial periods, but it
increases sharply as more periods are played. By period 10, the difference is very large
(293.5 vs. 10).
FINDING 2. Both reversible and irreversible investment lead to sig-
nificantly inefficient long-run public good levels. The optimal steady state is
y*=576 and the optimal investment policy is the fastest approach: invest W in every
period until y* is achieved. After 10 periods, the median stock of public good achieved
with the optimal investment trajectory is 576. In the experiments, the median stock
of public good levels out at about 12 under reversible investment economies, while it
keeps growing, but at an inefficiently slow pace, under irreversible investment. The me-
dian stock in periods 7-10 averages 13 in RIE and 280.5 in IIE. In both treatments the
average stock of public good in the last periods (periods 8 on) is significantly smaller
than the level predicted by the optimal solution (the level attainable investing W each
period) according to the results of a t-test on the equality of means (p < 0.01).
FINDING 3. In IIE, the efficiency of long-run public good levels is
midway between the planner solution and the prediction of the MPE. In
RIE, efficiency converges to the level predicted by the MPE. For each period
t, we define a normalized efficiency measure as Et = (y
t−ytMP )
(ytP−ytMP )
. We use ytMP , the
public good stock predicted by the MPE, as the lower bound for efficiency and ytP , the
public good stock in the planner solution, as the upper bound. Figure 2 shows the
evolution of Et over time for the two treatments. In periods 8-10, the median of Et
is 0.01 with reversible investment and 0.52 with irreversible investment. We highlight
two results. First, IIE is several orders of magnitude more efficient than RIE. Second,
RIE efficiency is essentially at the lower bound in the long run, indicating convergence
to the prediction of the MPE, while IIE efficiency is always very high.21
From Proposition 3, we know that, for the parameters of the experiment, almost
efficient levels of the public good can be supported as the outcome of the RIE game
21Both reversible and irreversible investment lead to normalized efficiency level significantly different
from 0, that is, the efficiency level predicted by the MPE. As discussed above, while this difference is
large for IIE, it is negligible and not economically significant for RIE.
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using non-stationary strategies.22 In the IIE games, on the other hand, the optimal
solution cannot be supported by any subgame perfect equilibrium with non-stationary
strategies when there is discounting. This is in stark contrast with the unique Markov
perfect equilibria derived in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, which predict the opposite compar-
ative static: the long run level of the public good is predicted to be ten times as large
with irreversible investment than with reversible investment.
The analysis of the public good outcomes suggests that the predictions of the
Markov perfect equilibrium are substantially more accurate than the prediction of the
“best” subgame perfect equilibrium (that is the Pareto superior equilibrium from the
point of view of the agents) for what concerns the long-run stock of public good in RIE
and the difference between storage technology. On the the other hand, the MPE that
we have adopted as benchmark does not capture finer details of the data, as the initial
levels of investment and the long run stock of public good in IIE. In Section 4.2, we
explore these discrepancies by focusing on individual investing behavior.
4.2 Investing Behavior
So far, we have presented results for the public good stock accumulated by each group.
In this section, we analyze the data at a finer level, using the investment decisions of
each single individual in each group.
How much do individual agents invest in the public good? Figure 2(a) shows the
time series of the median investment in the public good by treatment. The horizontal
axis is the time period and the vertical axis is the investment in the public good. The
maximum amount each agent can allocate to investment is the same in each period,
and it is given by W/n, which is equal to 5. The minimum amount each agent can
invest is always zero in the irreversible investment treatment, but it depends on the
stock at the beginning of the period in the reversible investment treatment (since each
agent can disinvest up to g/n units of the public good). For each period, we use the
median level of individual investment from all subjects in a given treatment. Similar
results hold if we use the mean or other measures of central tendency.
Figure 2(a) shows a series of interesting patterns. First, the median individual
investment is always higher with irreversible investment than with reversible investment
in periods 1-10. Second, the level of investment is decreasing, with median investment
converging quickly to values around zero for the reversible investment economies and
steadily decreasing towards zero for the irreversible economies.
22With the parameters of the experiment, the public good stock sustainable with the non-stationary
strategies proposed in the proof of Proposition 3 is 520 (vs. an efficient level of 576). This steady state
is reached in 9 periods (with investment equal to W=60 in the first 8 periods).
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Figure 2: Investing behavior.
How do these levels of individual investment compare to the theoretical predictions?
The median time paths from Figure 2(a) are qualitatively in line with the predicted
time paths: with reversible investment, the theory predicts positive investment only
in the first period (when the equilibrium steady state is reached) and zero investment
from the second period on; with irreversible investment, the theory predicts positive
investment in each period, but at a monotonically decreasing pace (with convergence to
the equilibrium steady state only asymptotically). There are, however, some differences
between the finer details of the theoretical predictions and the data. We observe over-
investment in the early periods: while individual investment is predicted to be less than
4 units in the first period for all treatments, we observe medians between 10 and 18.
In the reversible economies, this over-investment is corrected in the later periods: the
median investment falls sharply to zero and a large fraction of individuals disinvests,
with higher early over-investment followed by higher disinvestment.
The game we study is a dynamic game with an evolving state variable. It follows
that, to better compare the observed level of investment with the theoretical predic-
tions, we need to take into account the state variable faced by each agent when making
an allocation decision, that is the stock of the public good at the beginning of a pe-
riod. For each subject in each period, we calculate the difference between his observed
behavior and the investment predicted by the theory given the public good stock in his
19
group in that period. Figure 2(b) shows the time series of the median of this difference.
This series starts out significantly above zero for all treatments but decreases as more
periods of the same match are played, suggesting that subjects’ decisions respond to
the evolution of the state variable, with their investment behavior closely matching
the predictions of the unique concave Markovian equilibrium for later periods. Notice
that this pattern leads to public good outcomes that are in line with the equilibrium
steady states for reversible economies, but not for irreversible economies: in the former,
subjects can correct the initial over-investment with negative investment, while in the
latter the equilibrium investment for any level above the steady state (64) is bound to
be zero and the initial over-investment persists. We summarize these findings below.
FINDING 4. In both treatments, there is over-investment relative to the
equilibrium in the early periods. This is followed by negative investment
approaching the theoretical predictions in RIE, while the over-investment
decreases but persists in IIE. In both treatments, groups overshoot the equilibrium
in early periods by a factor of ten (RIE) or four (IIE).23 In RIE, this overshooting
is largely corrected in later periods via disinvestment. When investment is reversible,
convergence of the public good stock is close to equilibrium, with the difference between
the median public good levels and the equilibrium public good levels in the last 4 periods
of data measuring around 6 units of the public good. In IIE, investment remains positive
but is monotonically decreasing with periods of play (in the same match).24 Given the
public good stock by the end of period 2 is already above the predicted steady state
level (64), the positive - albeit slower - investment flow in the following periods brings
the long-run level of public good to be four times (280.5 vs. 64) larger than predicted.25
We now turn to a descriptive analysis of the individual allocations between invest-
ment in the public good and current consumption good, as a function of period of
play (within a match) and reversibility treatment. Table 3 shows the breakdown of
investment decisions for the two treatments into three canonical types: (1) Positive
Investment; (2) Zero Investment; and, for RIE, (3) Negative Investment. The first
and last categories are further broken down by whether investment in the public good
accounts for the maximum allowed by the mechanism or a smaller amount.
23The difference between the average investment in the early periods and the predicted investment
in these same periods is statistically significant at the 1% level for both treatments.
24Recall that in the IIE equilibrium, contribution is predicted to be positive in every period, and to
monotonically decline to 0.
25The difference between the average public good stock and the predicted public good stock in periods
6-10 is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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RIE IIE
INV TYPE ALL R1 R2-4 R5-7 R8-10 ALL R1 R2-4 R5-7 R8-10
INV > 0 67.0 100 57.8 44.7 39.2 82.8 100 96.4 77.9 59.5
* I = W 5.1 12.4 2.6 - - 27.7 47.9 35.7 21.4 9.5
* I ∈ (0,W ) 61.9 87.6 55.2 44.7 39.3 55.1 52.1 60.8 56.6 50.0
INV = 0 6.7 - 5.9 14.9 17.7 17.2 - 3.6 22.1 40.5
INV < 0 26.4 - 36.3 40.4 43.1 - - - - -
* I ∈ (0,− gn) 21.6 - 29.4 34.2 31.4 - - - - -
* I = −g/n 4.8 - 6.9 6.1 11.8 - - - - -
Table 3: Individual Investment Types, n = 3, # Observations: 705 for RIE, 1716 for IIE.
FINDING 5. In both treatments, most allocations involve positive in-
vestment in the public good. In RIE, a significant proportion of allocations
involve negative investment. In RIE, positive investment accounts for 67% of all
decisions; in IIIE, this type accounts for 82.8%. Allocations with zero or negative in-
vestment occurred 33.1% of the time in RIE groups, but only 17.2% of the time in IIE
groups. The difference is mostly due to the negative investment allocations (which are
not allowed in IIE). If we break down these categories by periods in more detail, the
proportion of positive (negative) decisions decreases (increases) with the period of play,
within a single match.
4.3 The Effect of Experience
Within the same match, subjects’ investing behavior gets closer to the predictions as
more periods are played. It is therefore natural to ask whether we observe a similar
pattern across matches. Do subjects choose allocations closer to the predictions of the
Markov equilibria when they are more experienced? Or do they still over-invest in early
periods and reduce investment in later periods, even after many matches of the same
(multi-period) game?
FINDING 6. There is no evidence of experience effects in the reversible
investment treatments. In the irreversible investment treatments, invest-
ment levels are higher in later matches. We compare the average investment in
each period in matches 1–5 and in matches 6–10. According to t-tests on the equality of
averages clustered by individuals, investment decisions are not affected by experience,
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at least not in the sense of playing closer to the theoretical predictions. In RIE, as
subjects play more matches within the same session their endowment allocation is not
significantly altered.26 In IIE, as subjects play more matches within the same session,
they slightly increase their investment in the public good. Average investment is higher
in late matches for all periods and this difference is statistically significant at the 1%
level in periods 1-5, at the 5% level in period 8, and at the 10% level in periods 6 and
7. This average increase is small in magnitude, ranging from 1.96 to 3.98 units.
4.4 Robustness: Larger Groups
All the results presented above hold in five-members groups. As the theory predicts,
the public good accumulation and the individual investment behavior are not sensitive
to the group size. We discuss below the difference in public good accumulation between
three-members and five-members groups.27
FINDING 7. Public good accumulation is higher in five members groups
than in three member groups. This difference, however, is statistically
significant only in the initial periods. For the same accumulation mechanism
(reversible or irreversible investment), the average and median stock of public good is
higher with five members groups than with three members groups in every single period.
However, this difference is small in magnitude (especially for the earlier periods and for
the reversible investment games) and, according to t-tests28, statistically significant at
conventional levels (p < 0.05) only for the first two periods in RIE, and the first four
periods in IIE. This is in line with the Markovian equilibria discussed in the previous
section, which predict small differences between the two group sizes. In RIE, the stock
is predicted to converge quickly to similar steady state levels (7.11 and 5.54). In IIE,
while the steady state levels are predicted to be exactly the same (64), the equilibrium
investment trajectory is somewhat slower with larger groups. However, the differences
induced by the different group sizes are small, with the predicted stock after 10 periods
equal to 42.20 with five members groups and 43.64 with three members groups.
4.5 A Direct Test of Markovian Behavior
The final questions we attempt to address are: To what extent are the models we use
adequate to study this problem? What equilibrium concepts should be used? This
26The difference is not statistically significant for any period.
27In Appendix B, we present tables and figures for five-members groups analogous to those presented
before for three-members groups. For a detailed discussion of these results, see Battaglini, Nunnari,
and Palfrey (2013).
28Similar results are obtained using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests.
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is a particularly important question since, depending on the equilibrium concept, we
can have very different predictions for the same model. While it is difficult to identify
the equilibrium adopted by players, the analysis of public good outcomes and investing
behavior provides some insights. As discussed above, we observe a consistent pattern of
behavior across groups, despite the fact that we have multiplicity of potential equilibria;
the investing behavior is correlated to the evolution of the stock in a way predicted by
the theory; and, at least for RIE, the long term public good outcomes are close to the
equilibrium steady states.
To further pursue this question, we construct a more direct test of the Markovian
restriction, that is, of the assumption that players are forward-looking and condition
their strategy only on the stock of the public good at the beginning of the period, irre-
spective of the histories. In particular, we conduct a one-period version of the reversible
investment game, where the payoffs from the public good stock are complemented by
the equilibrium value functions of the unique concave Markov perfect equilibrium of
the game. In each one-period game, agent j receives the following payoff:
U j(xj , y) = xj + α√y + δvR(y),
where xj is the private consumption of agent j, y is the end-of-period public good
stock, and δvR(y) is the discounted equilibrium value function from the dynamic game
with reversible investment.
In each experimental session, subjects play for 40 matches. Contrary to the dynamic
game, the length of each match is known and equal to one period. At the end of each
one-period match, subjects are reshuﬄed into new groups and the public good stock
starts out at a (potentially different) exogenous level. We use eight different g0, to
elicit an investment strategy (as a function of the state variable) comparable to the
one observed in the fully dynamic game. Table 4 below summarizes the experimental
design.
.
n W Groups Subjects g0
3 60 80 24 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35
5 80 60 30 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35
Table 4: Experimental design, one-period reduced form treatments.
In each experimental session, each of the eight values of g0 is used in five different
matches, in random order, for a total of forty matches. The range [0 − 35] covers
around 75% of observations in the dynamic game with three-members groups and
around 55% of observations in the dynamic game with five-members groups. In the
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one-period reduced form treatments, the unique equilibrium of the game prescribes
the same investment level predicted for the fully dynamic game under the Markovian
assumption that subjects condition their strategies only on the public good stock.
While there is no other equilibrium in this one-period game, in the fully dynamic game
there is a plethora of different subgame perfect equilibria that can sustain higher level
of investment with non-stationary strategies. Therefore, if we observe similar behavior
in the two treatments, we consider this as evidence of Markovian strategies in the fully
dynamic game. On the other hand, we can attribute differences in behavior to the
non-stationary strategies that can arise in a repeated game.
Figure 5 illustrates the median individual investment as a function of the initial
stock for the one-period reduced-form games described above and for the fully dynamic
games.29
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Figure 3: Investment as a function of beginning-of-period stocks, reduced form treatment vs.
dynamic treatment. Note: the bold lines represent median investments; the green dotted lines
give the interquartile range for the dynamic treatment.
FINDING 8. In RIE, there is evidence of Markovian, forward-looking
behavior. For three-members groups, investment is significantly higher in the dynamic
29Since the beginning-of-period stock in the dynamic games is endogenous and does not necessarily
match the values used in the one-period games, for these games we use the median investment levels
for all periods-groups that started with a public good stock in a 6 experimental units interval around
the starting size used in the one-period games. For example, the median investment corresponding to a
beginning-of-period stock of 20 is computed as the median investment from all periods-groups starting
at a stock between 17 and 23. This allows us to have a comparable number of observations between
one-period and dynamic games. The results are the same when we use intervals of 8 or 10 experimental
units.
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treatment for initial stocks of 0, 25, 30, and 35, and statistically indistinguishable for
the remaining initial stocks. For five-members groups, investment is significantly higher
in the dynamic treatment for initial stocks of 0, 25, and 35; it is significantly higher in
the reduced form treatment for initial stocks of 5, 10, and 20; and it is statistically indis-
tinguishable for the remaining initial stocks (15 and 30). While there is some significant
difference, these differences are small in magnitude (with the exception of initial stocks
greater than 25 for n = 3), and we cannot conclude that investment is higher in the
fully dynamic game than in the reduced form game (as a consequence of non-stationary
strategies). As shown by Figure 6, the median investment in the one-shot treatment
is in the interquartile range of the investment observed in the dynamic treatment for
all initial stocks in both treatments, with the exception of an initial stock of 35 for
the three-members groups. Regarding the high investment in the dynamic treatment
for three-member groups and stocks greater than 25, this is due to a few groups who
invested significantly more heavily than predicted by the Markov perfect equilibrium,
but this only happened rarely and most of the observations from the dynamic treat-
ment (where the initial public good stock is endogenous) have a beginning-of-period
stock smaller than 25.30
5 Static versus Dynamic: What Have We Learned?
While this is the first experimental study of the dynamic accumulation process of a
durable public good, a vast experimental literature has addressed the provision of public
goods in static environments. This begs the following questions: How do the results
from our dynamic public good experiments compare to the results from the repeated
static public good games? What new insights can we learn breaking out from the static
framework?
Comparing directly our dynamic game with the static framework used by the pre-
vious experimental literature is generally a difficult task, for a number of reasons. Even
when static public good games are repeated a fixed number of times, the strategic envi-
ronment is the same in every period, and there is a unique equilibrium prediction, that
does not change over time. The most common example is the voluntary contribution
game with linear payoffs, in which the individually optimal investment level is zero,
30Since the beginning-of-period stock in the dynamic treatment is endogenous we have a reduced
number of observations for these high values: we use only 10 groups to compute the median investment
for a starting stock of 35. The remaining 60 groups never accumulated these levels of public good.
The beginning-of-period stock is smaller than 25 in 60% of observations (regardless of period number).
The average beginning-of-period public good stock in periods 8-10 (that is, the long run level of public
good) is 18.4.
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while the socially optimal one is the whole budget. The equilibrium is in dominant
strategies, so contributions in past and future periods do not matter for equilibrium
behavior, and agents’ expectations about other agents’ current or future contributions
are irrelevant from the standpoint of equilibrium.31 The game we study, on the other
hand, is not only a repeated game, but a stochastic game with an evolving state vari-
able, and a strategic environment that changes in every period (as the durable public
good is accumulated over time). Our theory makes predictions that are path dependent
and change over time (equilibrium investments are sometimes positive, sometimes neg-
ative, and sometimes zero, depending on the current stock of public good), and, while
we restrict attention to the unique Markov perfect equilibrium, the infinite horizon of
the game generates a plethora of non-stationary equilibria that have much different
properties. In this dynamic setting, not contributing is socially optimal in some con-
tinuation games (when the stock of the public good has reached the optimal level).
More importantly, at any point in time, even in a Markov equilibrium, the individu-
ally optimal decision depends on past contributions through their effect on the current
state, as well as on the expectations on current and future contributions of other agents.
Moreover, a fundamental question of our paper, the impact of investment reversibility
on the dynamic free rider problem, cannot be studied in a static framework where the
public good starts out at zero in every period (and, thus, contributions can only be
non-negative).
In spite of these clear difficulties in comparing the two frameworks, we can still
draw some connections between the behavior observed in repeated static public good
games and behavior in our dynamic durable public good experiments. In the reminder
of this section we discuss a few of the most significant similarities and differences.
Over-investment, efficiency and irreversibility. The first has to do with the gen-
eral issue of whether contributions tend to be above, below, or approximately equal to
the theoretically predicted levels. In static environments, with few exceptions, actual
contributions are generally above the equilibrium levels suggesting that theoretical pre-
dictions tend to overstate the seriousness of free riding.32 Still, contributions not only
fail to reach efficient levels (as Ledyard 1995 reports in his survey), but are generally
very much below. Average contributions in initial plays of the game typically fall in
a range between 40% and 60% of the optimal level, with a systematic decline to very
31This applies as well to some of the dynamic games based on the linear voluntary contributions
model, including the variation with no completion benefit in Duffy et al. 2008.
32There are a few exceptions. Laury and Holt (2008) investigate non-linear, static public good
technologies with interior equilibrium contributions. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) explore threshold
public goods with binary contribution decisions. For some of the treatments in these two papers,
contributions are less than equilibrium predictions.
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low levels with repetition (between 10% and 20% of the optimal level after 10 periods
of play). Similarly, in our dynamic environment, there is significant over-contribution
with respect to the predictions of the unique MPE in the early periods of play while the
public good stock is beginning to accumulate, but this over-contribution mostly disap-
pears in later periods (especially with reversible investment, where the long run stock
of the public good is very close to the MPE steady state). These declines over time in
both the reversible and irreversible cases lead to significantly inefficient long-run public
good levels (see Figure 2, and Findings 1 and 2). How serious is the inefficiency with
a durable public good, as compared to one-shot public goods problems? Interestingly,
the answer depends critically on whether contributions are reversible. With reversibil-
ity, the median public good stock converges to approximately 2% of the efficient steady
state. In contrast, with irreversibility, the median period 10 stock of public good is
approximately 50% of the efficient level. Thus, with reversible investments we see con-
tribution levels that are less than is typically observed in static voluntary contribution
games, but the opposite is the case with irreversible investment. The effect of irre-
versibility, clearly important in real world applications of the theory, can clearly not
be observed in static models or in repeated models without a state variable.
Investment pattern and dynamics. Second, there are some similarities in terms of
the investment pattern we observe over time: as in the static literature, in our dynamic
experiments, there is a tendency for initial over-investment in the early periods, followed
by investment levels approaching the theoretical predictions (see Figures 4 and 5).
Moreover, a similar pattern is observed when subjects are re-matched into new groups
and the public good stock starts out at zero, a phenomenon similar to the “re-start
effect” from the static literature (see Andreoni and Croson 2008 for a survey).
Contrary to much of the static literature—where the predictions are no contribu-
tions in every period—the time paths we observe in the dynamic games are qualitatively
in line with the predicted time paths. With reversible investment, the theory predicts
positive investment only in the first period and zero investment from the second pe-
riod on. With irreversible investment, the theory predicts positive investment in each
period, but at a monotonically decreasing pace. These general patterns are found in
our data. Moreover, the convergence to the equilibrium predictions follows a different
pattern from static experiments and the equilibrium predictions themselves are path
dependent and endogenous: in the treatment with reversibility, we observe significant
levels of negative investment, with subjects reacting to above-equilibrium accumula-
tion levels and the stock of public good gradually declining in the direction of the
equilibrium steady state.
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Heterogeneity in behavior. Finally, another finding of the more recent exper-
imental literature on static public good games is the existence of distinct types of
behavior. This was first considered by Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984), who clas-
sify each investment decision as being “Strong Free-Riding”, “Weak Free-Riding” or
“Lindahl/Altruistic” depending on whether the investment is less than 33%, between
33% and 66%, and more than 66% of the individual budget, respectively. 33 According
to this classification, they report 44% of investment decisions in their experiment are
Strong Free-Riding, 27% are Weak Free-Riding, and 29% are Lindahl/Altruistic. We
applied a similar analysis to our data (adjusting for the fact that the individual bud-
get in the reversible investment treatments is state-dependent) and we found a rather
similar distribution of decision types (pooling all treatments together): 42% of invest-
ment decisions in our experiments are Strong Free-Riding, 18% are decisions are Weak
Free-Riding, and 41% are Lindahl/Altruistic.
A different approach traces these aggregate patterns of contribution behavior to
heterogeneity at the individual level. For example, there is some evidence from static
public good experiments that some individuals behave as “conditional cooperators”,
whose contribution to the public good is positively correlated with their beliefs about
the contributions made by their group members (Keser and Van Winden 2000, Fis-
chbacher et al. 2001, Burlando and Guala 2005, Fischbacher and Gaechter 2010).34
While subjects in our experiment are not explicitly asked to make decisions contingent
on the other group members’ contributions, over the course of the experiment they
experience a wide range of (endogenous) past group decisions and we can use this data
to measure the extent to which individual contributions respond positively to other
group members’ past contributions. There is also evidence for the existence of other
behavioral types who are either altruistic or completely selfish.
To identify these different behavioral types, for each subject we estimate a Tobit
regression of the deviation from predicted investment (notice that, in the static exper-
iment, this is simply equal to the investment level) on the average investment of the
other group members in the previous period (with a constant). We then classify each
subject as a conditional cooperator if the slope is significantly different than 0 at the 1%
level; as an “unconditional cooperator” if the slope is not significantly different than 0
and his average investment deviation is in the third quantile; as “free rider” if the slope
is not significantly different than 0 and his average investment deviation is in the first
33They do not actually classify individuals into behavioral types based on their behavior in the 10
periods of play.
34There are different possible interpretations for these behavioral types, such as imitation, conformity,
reciprocity, repeated game strategies, etc.
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quantile. The results are reported in Table 5. Overall, we measure 68% conditional
cooperators, 10% unconditional cooperators, 13% free riders, and 9% unclassified. This
distribution of behavioral types is roughly in line with the static literature, although
there is considerable variation.35.
IIE, 3 IIE, 5 RIE, 3 RIE, 5 Overall
Unconditional Cooperator - 13% (4) 19% (4) 10% (3) 10%(11)
Conditional Cooperator 100% (24) 80% (24) 52% (11) 40% (12) 68% (71)
Free Rider - 3% (1) 24% (5) 27% (8) 13% (14)
Other - 3% (1) 5% (1) 23% (7) 9% (9)
Table 5: Classification of Subjects’ Strategies. The number of subjects is in
parentheses.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper investigated the dynamic accumulation process of a durable public good in
a voluntary contribution setup. Despite the fact that most, if not all, public goods are
durable and have an important dynamic component, very little is known on this subject,
both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. We attempt to provide some initial
empirical findings about voluntary contribution behavior with durable public goods.
We have considered two possible cases: economies with reversible investments
(RIE), in which in every period individual investments can either be positive or nega-
tive; and economies with irreversible investments (IIE), in which the public good can-
not be reduced. Reversibility is an important feature of many public goods problems
(for example, common pool problems), which is completely missed by static analysis.
We also have a secondary treatment dimension: we compare three-members and five-
members groups. For all treatments, we have characterized the steady states and the
accumulation paths that can be supported by the optimal solution and by the unique
symmetric concave Markov equilibrium.
We highligh three main results. First, the dynamic free riding problem exists and
it is severe, with the long run public good stock levels falling far short of efficiency
35The fraction of conditional cooperators in those studies is usually around 50-60%, but ranges from
35% (Burlando and Guala 2005) to 80% (Keser and Van Winden 2000)
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in all treatments. The additional free riding component that emerges in this dynamic
game is most obviously seen in reversible investment economies. With reversibility, the
dynamic dimension exacerbates the free rider problem present in static public good
provision: if an agent contributes above the equilibrium levels, not only this reduces
the future contributions by all agents, but it triggers negative investment by other
agents that transform part of the public good stock in private consumption. In these
treatments, the median public good stock converges to approximately 2% of the efficient
steady states, versus long run contributions between 10% and 20% of the optimal level
in repeated static public good games.
On the other hand, in line with the comparative static predictions, irreversible
investment leads to significantly higher public good production than reversible invest-
ment. The irreversibility constraint dampens the dynamic free riding problem, by
creating a commitment device and reducing the strategic substitutability of contribu-
tions. Notice that this has nothing to do with history dependent trigger strategies
made possible by the infinite horizon: a similar dynamic would arise in a model with
a finite horizon (but losing stationarity of equilibrium strategies). In the treatments
where the public good cannot be converted back to consumption, the median period
10 stock of the public good is approximately 50% of the efficient level.
Second, we have shown that, in both treatments, there is over-investment in the
early periods, compared to the equilibrium investment levels. In the treatment with
reversibility, this is followed by a significant reversal, with the stock of public good
gradually declining in the direction of the equilibrium steady state. When disinvestment
is not feasible, investment steadily decreases but the initial over-investment cannot be
corrected and the long run level of the public good remains significantly above the
equilibrium steady state.
Third, we have proposed a novel experimental methodology to test the assumption
that subjects’ strategies in this complex infinite-horizon game depend only on the state
variable, that is, the accumulated level of the public good. We have shown that, for
the reversible investment treatment, there is evidence of Markovian, forward-looking
behavior.
This is the first experimental study of the dynamic accumulation process of a
durable public good. Our design was intentionally very simple and used a limited
set of treatments. As a consequence, there are many possible directions for the next
steps in this research. The theory has interesting comparative static predictions about
the effect of other parameters that we have not explored in this work, such as: the
discount factor; the depreciation level; preferences; and endowments. For example,
a higher discount factor increases both the optimal steady state and the equilibrium
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steady state of the durable public good for all values of n and for both reversible and
irreversible economies. For similar reasons, positive depreciation in the public good
technology leads to a decrease in the steady state of the Markov equilibrium studied
here. Among these extensions, it would be particularly interesting to run experiments
that allow a closer comparison with the results from the static literature. This can be
done in a number of different ways: for example, experiments with a finite and known
horizon of one period (that is, δ = 0), or experiments with full depreciation of the stock
at the end of each period and an infinite horizon (that is, δ > 0).
Moreover, our model and experimental design does not consider different rules for
negative investment (for example, allowing subjects to disinvest unilaterally up to the
whole stock and adopting a rationing rule to keep a nonnegative level of public good),
or the effect of a completion benefit at a specified accumulation threshold. We have
also limited the analysis to voluntary contribution mechanisms that turn out to be
highly inefficient, both in theory and in practice. Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey
(2012b) study how centralized mechanisms fare in providing durable public goods and
show that efficiency increases with the majority rule required to approve an allocation
decision. An interesting direction to pursue from here would be to consider different
decentralized mechanisms and explore which ones are more efficient for the provision
of durable public goods.
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Appendix A - Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
The fact that a strictly concave equilibrium has the property stated in the proposition
follows from the discussion in the text. Here we prove existence and uniqueness.
Existence. First note that when we use the functional form u(g) = α√g, we have
u′(g) = α2√g and [u′]−1(x) =
(
α
2x
)2. Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey (Forthcoming)
show that there is a weakly concave Markov equilibrium with steady state equal to
y∗R for any y∗R ∈
[(
αn
2(n−δ)
)2
,
(
α
2(1−δ)
)2]
. To prove that the equilibrium corresponding
to the steady state y∗R =
(
αn
2(n−δ)
)2
is strictly concave we provide an alternative (self
contained) existence proof.
Let y∗R =
(
αn
2(n−δ)
)2
, and g1R = max {0, y∗R −W}. For any g > g1R define a value
function v1R(g) =
W−(y∗R−g)
n +
1
1−δ
[
α
√
y∗R + δWn
]
. Note that this function is continuous,
non decreasing, weakly concave and differentiable with respect to g, with derivative[
v1R
]′ (g) = 1n . From strict concavity of u(g) it follows that, for any g > g1R, the
objective function in (2) is strictly concave. Let g2R = max
{
0, g1R −W
}
, and define:
v2R(g) =
{
v1R(g) g ≥ g1R
α
√
g +W + δv1R (g +W ) g ∈
[
g2R, g
1
R
)
Note that v2R(g) is continuous and differentiable in g ≥ g2R, except at most at g1R. To
see that the objective function in (2) is strictly concave in this interval, note that it is
strictly concave for g ≥ g1R. Moreover, for any g ∈
[
g2R, g
1
R
)
and g′ ≥ g1R we have:[
v2R
]′
(g) = α2
√
g +W + δ
[
v1R
]′
(g +W )
>
α
2
√
y∗R
+ δ
[
v1R
]′
(y∗R) = 1 >
1
n
=
[
v1R
]′
(g)
The first inequality derives from y∗R > g+W (which is true, by definition of g1R and g2R,
for all g ∈ [g2R, g1R)), strict concavity of u(g) and weak concavity of v1R(g). It follows that
u(g) + δv2R(g) is strictly concave in g ≥ g2R. Assume that for all g ≥ gnR, with gnR ≥ 0
and either gnR < g2R or gnR = 0, we have defined a value function vnR(g) that is concave
and continuous, and that is differentiable in g > g1R. Define gn+1R = max {0, gnR −W},
and
vn+1R (g) =
 v
n
R(g) g ≥ gnR
α
√
g +W + δvnR(g +W ) g ∈
[
gn+1R , g
n
R
)
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Using the same steps as above, we can easily show that this function is weakly concave,
continuous in g ≥ gn+1R , and differentiable for g > g1R. Moreover, either gn+1R = 0 or
gn+1R < g
n
R. We can therefore define inductively a value function vR(g) for any g ≥ 0
that is continuous, weakly concave, and that is differentiable at least for g > g1R and
so, in particular, at y∗R. This value function will give rise to an objective function in
(2) which is strictly concave Define now the following strategies:
yR(g) = min {W + g, y∗R} , and xA(g) = [W + g − yR(g)] /n. (5)
We will argue that vR(g), yR(g), xA(g) is an equilibrium. To see this note that by
construction, if the agent uses strategies yR(g), xA(g), then vR(g) describe the expected
continuation value function of an agent. To see that yR(g), xA(g), are optimal given
vR(g) note that for g ≥ g1R,
{
y∗R,
W+g−y∗R
n
}
maximizes (2) when all the constraints
except the second are considered; and for g ≥ g1R, W +g > y∗R, so the second constraint
is satisfied as well. For g < g1R, we must have yR(g) = W + g, xA(g) = 0. We conclude
that yR(g), xA(g) is an optimal reaction function given vR(g). 
Uniqueness. Consider a strictly concave equilibrium with value function vR(g).
Because u(g) + δvR(g) − g is strictly concave, there is a unique maximum y∗R of the
objective function of (2). It follows that we must have yR(g) = min {W + g, y∗R},
implying that yR(g) = y∗R for any g ≥ y∗R −W and yR(y∗R) = y∗R. It is straightforward
to show that the derivative of the value function in g ≥ y∗R − W exists and it is
equal to v′R(g) = 1/n. Using the first order condition that defines y∗R, we must have
α
2
√
y∗R
+ δv′R(y∗R) = 1. This implies that in any strictly concave Markov equilibrium we
must have a steady state y∗R =
(
αn
2(n−δ)
)2
. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Since the equilibrium is weakly concave, we must have that vIR(g) admits a right and
left derivative at any point g. Let us call y+IR(y∗IR) and y
−
IR(y∗IR)) the, respectively,
right and left derivatives. Since at y∗R we must have yIR(y∗IR) = y∗IR, it is easy to see
that y+IR(y∗IR) = 1, since yIR(y∗IR + ∆) = y∗IR + ∆.
Consider now the left derivative. In a left neighborhood of y∗IR, we must have
yIR(g) ∈ (0,W + g), so xIR(g) > 0 and
yIR(g) ∈ arg max
y
{α√y + δvIR(y)− y} (6)
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. We can write:
vIR(g) =
W + g − yIR(g)
n
+ α
√
yIR(g) + δvIR(g) (yIR(g))
= α
√
yIR(g) + δvIR(g) (yIR(g))− yIR(g) + W + g − (n− 1)yIR(g)
n
By the theorem of the maximum we therefore have: v′IR(g) = 1n +
n−1
n y
′
IR(g). Com-
bining this expression with the first order condition of (6) we obtain:
y′IR(g) =
1− n
(
1− α2√g
)
/δ
1− n
for any g < y∗IR. At y∗IR the left derivative must therefore be y−IR(y∗IR) =
1−n
(
1− α
2
√
y∗
IR
)
/δ
1−n .
Imposing y−IR(y∗IR) = y
+
IR(y∗IR) = 1, we obtain that in any concave Markov equilibrium
with irreversibility we must have y∗IR =
(
α
2(1−δ)
)2
as claimed. 
Proof of Proposition 3
The efficient outcome (the social planner solution characterized in Section 2.1) can be
sustained in the voluntary contribution game with reversible investment, when agents
use non-stationary strategies entailing reversal to the unique concave Markov equilib-
rium characterized in Section 2.2. To show this, we construct strategies whose outcome
is the efficient level of public good and we show that there is no profitable deviation
from the equilibrium path. The symmetric strategy for each group member is to invest
i∗P (g) = min
{
W
n ,
y∗P−g
n
}
if gt = y∗(gt−1) (i.e., if the observed level of the public good
at the beginning of the period is consistent with equilibrium strategies, or, in other
words, it is the efficient level of public good given the stock of g at the beginning of
the previous period) and to invest i∗R(g) = min
{
W
n ,
y∗R−g
n
}
where y∗R < y∗P (i.e., the
investment associated with the Markov equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1) if
gt 6= y∗(gt−1) (i.e., if a deviation from equilibrium has occurred in the previous pe-
riod). To prove that this strategy profile is an equilibrium we show that agents have
no profitable deviation.
An agent’s payoff if she follows the equilibrium strategy is:
W
n
− i∗P (g) + α
√
g + ni∗P (g) + δVEQ(g + ni
∗
P (g))
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An agent’s payoff if she deviates (according to her most profitable deviation) is:
W
n
+ g
n
+ α
√
g − g
n
+ (n− 1)i∗P (g) + δVDEV
(
g − g
n
+ (n− 1)i∗P (g)
)
An agent’s most profitable deviation is to invest −g/n (i.e. to subtract from the
public good her share and to consume it). The gains from this deviation are greater
the closer g is to y∗P . Therefore, we will check whether an agent has an incentive to
deviate when g ∈ [gP , y∗P ], or whether:
W
n
−y
∗
P − g
n
+α
√
y∗P+δVEQ(y
∗
P ) ≥
W
n
+ g
n
+α
√
g − g
n
+ (n− 1)y
∗
P − g
n
+δVDEV
(
g − g
n
+ (n− 1)y
∗
P − g
n
)
where VEQ(y∗P ) = 11−δ
[
W
n + α
√
y∗P
]
, and:
VDEV
(
n− 1
n
y∗P
)
= W
n
− y
∗
R − n−1n y∗P
n
+ α
√
y∗R + δVDEV (y
∗
R)
= W
n
− y
∗
R − n−1n y∗P
n
+ α
√
y∗R +
δ
1− δ
(
W
n
+ α
√
y∗R
)
After we plug in VEQ(y∗P ) and VDEV
(
n−1
n y
∗
P
)
and we re-arrange terms, the inequal-
ity above becomes:
1
1− δ
[
α
√
y∗P − δα
√
y∗R
]
− δ
n
[(n− 1)
n
y∗P − y∗R
]
≥ α
√
n− 1
n
y∗P +
y∗P
n
Replacing y∗P =
(
αn
2(1−δ)
)2
and y∗R =
(
αn
2(n−δ)
)2
, the inequality we want to prove
becomes:
1
1− δ
[
α2n
2(1− δ) −
δα2n
2(n− δ)
]
−δ(n− 1)α
2
4(1− δ)2 +δn
(
α
2(n− δ)
)2
≥ α
2n
2(1− δ)
√
n− 1
n
+ α
2n
4(1− δ)2
Multiplying both sides by (1− δ)2 and rearranging, we have:
α2n
2 −
α2n
4 −
δα2(n− 1)
4 ≥ (1− δ)
α2n
2
√
n− 1
n
− δn
(
α(1− δ)
2(n− δ)
)2
+ (1− δ)δα
2n
2(n− δ)
There is δ̂R such that ∀δ > δ̂R the inequality above holds. To see this note that as
δ approaches 1 the RHS approaches zero, while the LHS is positive for any δ ∈ [0, 1].

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Using the parameters and the utility function of our experiments, δ̂R = 0.80 for
n = 3 and δ̂R = 0.86 for n = 5. We use δ = 0.75, which means that, in the experimen-
tal setting, the efficient level of the public good cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
However, it can be shown that non-stationary strategies of the type proposed above
can sustain an almost efficient level of the public good, y∗. In this case, the inequality
we want to prove is:
1
1− 0.75
[
4
√
y∗ − 3
√
y∗R
]
− 0.75
n
[(n− 1)
n
y∗ − y∗R
]
≥ 4
√
n− 1
n
y∗ + y
∗
n
This inequality holds for y∗ = 520 in the treatment with 3 agents (where y∗P = 576)
and for y∗ = 1332 in the treatment with 5 agents (where y∗P = 1600).
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Appendix B - Additional Tables and Figures [Not For Pub-
lication]
Period RIE 3 RIE 5
Theory Obs Avg Mdn SD Theory Obs Avg Mdn SD
1 7.11 70 31.71 31.5 9.04 5.54 60 47.38 50.5 19.35
2 7.11 46 47.54 45.5 21.65 5.54 48 70.21 97.5 45.73
3 7.11 31 38.87 20 31.77 5.54 33 59.97 34 60.76
4 7.11 24 35.83 22 36.62 5.54 24 51.08 22.5 56.01
5 7.11 21 29.14 12 36.14 5.54 21 42.29 27 52.33
6 7.11 10 27.30 18.5 30.34 5.54 15 50.60 32 45.00
7 7.11 7 16.71 12 13.03 5.54 12 36.58 36.5 31.90
8 7.11 7 17.29 12 16.39 5.54 12 44.50 42.5 31.58
9 7.11 7 18.71 16 8.44 5.54 6 32.00 35.5 19.97
10 1.77 3 16.00 10 10.39 5.54 6 28.83 22 25.86
11 7.11 3 21.67 29 14.47 5.54 3 24.00 24 2.00
12 7.11 3 26.67 31 11.15 5.54 3 30.67 43 24.01
13 7.11 3 30.33 31 16.01 5.54 3 31.67 37 25.42
Table 6: Summary statistics of public good stock per period, RIE. Observations are groups.
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Period IIE 3 IIE 5
Theory Obs Avg Mdn SD Theory Obs Avg Mdn SD
1 21.32 80 48.66 50 8.90 18.88 60 56.12 57 13.55
2 27.04 72 94.32 97 19.68 24.56 57 109.86 114 28.39
3 30.96 64 137.39 142.5 31.68 28.52 54 158.74 168.5 46.87
4 33.92 60 175.32 180 45.18 31.64 42 200.36 218 62.79
5 36.28 56 208.30 209 60.34 34.12 33 239.15 244 88.65
6 38.24 52 242.94 241 72.79 36.24 30 270.67 270 113.28
7 39.88 40 273.80 269 85.92 38.04 21 301.71 292 134.20
8 41.32 36 291.72 287.5 97.47 39.64 18 323.93 324 154.00
9 42.56 28 308.50 314.5 112.57 41.04 15 345.27 346 182.95
10 43.64 20 298.40 293.5 119.39 42.28 12 386.08 367 188.00
11 44.60 20 315.40 318 130.79 43.40 6 366.33 308.5 244.92
12 45.48 16 303.75 291 122.83 44.44 − − − −
13 46.28 8 382.25 385 102.04 45.40 − − − −
14 47.00 8 400.38 391.5 116.78 46.28 − − − −
15 47.64 4 435.00 424.5 191.57 47.08 − − − −
16 48.24 4 465.00 459.5 207.09 47.84 − − − −
17 48.80 4 495.75 496 223.46 48.52 − − − −
Table 7: Summary statistics of public good stock per period, IIE. Observations are groups.
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Period RIE 3 RIE 5
Obs Avg Mdn SD Obs Avg Mdn SD
1 210 10.57 10 5.85 300 9.48 11 6.76
2 138 5.46 5 8.88 240 3.79 4 10.49
3 93 −2.55 0 11.63 165 −1.78 −2 11.61
4 72 −1.60 0 10.58 120 −1.74 0 12.28
5 63 −0.92 0 8.46 105 −2.8 −2 11.29
6 30 1.13 0 5.82 75 0.76 0 11.64
7 21 0.00 0 5.22 60 −2.37 −1.5 12.87
8 21 0.19 0 4.57 60 1.58 0 9.45
9 21 0.48 0 7.22 30 −1.93 −2 9.09
10 9 −3.22 −5 6.34 30 −0.63 −2 8.03
11 9 1.89 4 6.15 15 3.33 2 5.37
12 9 1.67 3 9.92 15 1.33 −1 6.38
13 9 1.22 0 9.09 15 0.20 0 6.68
Table 8: Summary statistics of individual investment per period, RIE. Observations are
individual investment decisions.
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Period IIE 3 IIE 5
Obs Avg Mdn SD Obs Avg Mdn SD
1 240 16.22 18 4.61 300 11.22 14 5.36
2 216 15.30 16 5.52 285 10.68 12 5.63
3 192 14.39 15 5.66 270 9.88 11 5.97
4 180 13.02 15 6.15 210 8.83 8.5 6.23
5 168 10.82 10 7.23 165 7.73 8 6.28
6 156 9.83 10 7.46 150 6.70 5 6.29
7 120 8.43 5 7.61 105 6.43 4 6.51
8 108 6.39 5 6.90 90 5.91 3 6.32
9 84 5.77 4.5 6.85 75 5.27 2 6.33
10 60 5.87 4.5 6.67 60 4.00 0 6.11
11 60 5.67 1.5 7.27 30 2.73 0 5.07
12 48 4.15 1 6.15 − − − −
13 24 6.21 4.5 7.42 − − − −
14 24 6.04 3 7.62 − − − −
15 12 10.83 10 8.75 − − − −
16 12 10.00 8 7.89 − − − −
17 12 10.25 9 7.69 − − − −
Table 9: Summary statistics of individual investment per period, IIE. Observations are
individual investment decisions.
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Period RIE3 vs. IIE3 RIE5 vs. IIE5 RIE3 vs. RIE5 IIE3 vs. IIE5
1 0.0000 0.0050 0.0000 0.0001
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0004
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0897 0.0040
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.2700 0.0211
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.3493 0.0543
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.1661 0.1810
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.1375 0.3270
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0506 0.3253
9 0.0000 0.0006 0.1358 0.4186
10 0.0006 0.0003 0.4473 0.1158
Table 10: P-values of t-tests on the equality of public good stock averages.
RIE 3 RIE 5
g0 invD invOS p-value invD invOS p-value
0 10.56 6.48 0.0000 9.48 7.24 0.0009
5 4.84 4.08 0.5972 2.12 4.88 0.0022
10 2.00 2.08 0.2287 0.72 3.72 0.0003
15 0.44 0.64 0.8538 1.88 2.76 0.3939
20 -0.96 -2.08 0.3119 -1.52 0.25 0.0338
25 -0.76 -3.72 0.0033 2.16 -0.12 0.0473
30 1.40 -5.52 0.0000 -1.34 -1.44 0.9320
35 7.28 -7.52 0.0000 1.40 -2.28 0.0105
Table 11: Average individual investment as a function of beginning-of-the-period public good
stock in dynamic experiments vs reduced form one shot experiments, RIE with n=3 and n=5.
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RIE IIE
INV TYPE ALL R1-3 R4-6 R7-10 ALL R1-3 R4-6 R7-10
INV > 0 51.5% 62.3% 37.0% 36.9% 83.1% 93.1% 81.7% 61.1%
* I = W 26.4% 35.6% 13.7% 14.7% 33.1% 41.9% 28.0% 19.4%
* I ∈ (0,W ) 25.0% 26.7% 23.3% 23.2% 40.0% 60.2% 53.7% 44.7%
INV = 0 12.9% 11.5% 14.0% 15.6% 17.0% 6.9% 18.3% 38.9%
INV < 0 35.7% 26.2% 49.0% 47.6% - - - -
* I ∈ (0,− gn) 29.0% 21.8% 36.3% 41.8% - - - -
* I = − gn 6.7% 4.4% 12.7% 5.8% - - - -
Table 12: Individual Investment Types, n = 5, # Observations: 1230 for RIE, 1740 for IIE.
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Figure 4: Public good stock, n = 5.
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Figure 5: Investing behavior, n = 5.
Appendix C [Not For Publication]
Sample Experimental Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS FOR RIE5 TREATMENT
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. During the experiment
we require your complete, undistracted attention and ask that you follow instructions
carefully. Please turn off your cell phones. Do not open other applications on your
computer, chat with other students, or engage in other distracting activities, such as
reading books, doing homework, etc. You will be paid for your participation in cash,
at the end of the experiment. Different participants may earn different amounts. What
you earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly
on chance. It is important that you not talk or in any way try to communicate with
other participants during the experiments.
Following the instructions, there will be a practice session and a short comprehen-
sion quiz. All questions on the quiz must be answered correctly before continuing to
the paid session. At the end you will be paid in private and you are under no obligation
to tell others how much you earned. Your earnings are denominated in FRANCS which
will be converted to dollars at the rate of 75 FRANCS to a DOLLAR.
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Figure 6: Quartiles of time paths of the stock of g. Notes: panel (a) for RIE with n = 5,
panel (b) for IIE with n = 5, panel (c) for RIE with n = 3, panel (d) for IIE with n = 3; the
continuous line represents the median, while the dashed lines represent the interquartile range.
This is an experiment in group decision making. The experiment will take place
over a sequence of 10 matches. We begin the match by dividing you into THREE
groups of five members each. Each of you is assigned to exactly one of these groups.
In each match each member of your group will make investment decisions.
In each round, each member of your group has a budget of 16 francs. Each member
must individually decide how to divide his or her budget into private investment and
project investment, in integer amounts. The private investment always has to be greater
than or equal than 0. The project investment can be either positive, or zero, or negative.
Any amount you allocate to private investment goes directly to your earnings for this
round. The project investment produces earnings for all group members in the following
way.
[SHOW SLIDE]
The project earnings in a round depend on the size of the project at the end of
that round. Specifically, each group member earns an amount in francs proportional
to the square root of the size of the project at the end of the round (precisely equal
to 4*sqrt(project size)). Thus, for example, if the size of the project at the end of the
round equals 9, then each member earns exactly 4*sqrt(9)=12 additional francs in that
round. If the size is equal to 36, each member earns exactly 4*sqrt(36)=24 additional
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francs in that round. In your display, earnings are always rounded to two decimal
places. So, for example if the project size at the end of a round equals 5, each member
earns 4*sqrt(5)=8.94 francs from the project in that round.
The second important fact about the project is that it is durable. That is, project
investment in a round increases or decreases the size not just for that round, but also
for all future rounds. The size of your group’s project starts at 0 in the first round of
the match. At the end of the first round it is equal to the sum of your group members’
project investment in that round. This amount gets carried over to the second round.
Whenever the size of the project is greater than 0, you can propose a negative project
investment. However, in this case, the proposed negative investment cannot exceed one
fifth of the size of the project at the beginning of the round (in other words, you can
dispose only of your share of the project).At the end of the second round, the size of
the project equals to the combined amount invested in the project in rounds 1 and 2 by
all members of your group, and so forth. So, every round project investment changes
the size of the project for the current round and all future rounds of the match.
The total number of rounds in a match will depend on the rolling of a fair 8-sided
die. When the first round ends, we roll it to decide whether to move on to the second
round. If the die comes up a 1 or a 2 we do not go on to round 2, and the match is over.
Otherwise, we continue to the next round. We continue to more rounds, until a 1 or a
2 is rolled at the end of a round and the match ends. At the end of each round your
earnings for that round are computed by adding the project earnings to your private
investment. For example, if your private investment is 20 and the end-of-round project
size is 9, then your earnings for that round equal 20 + 4*sqrt(9) = 20+12 = 32. Your
earnings for the match equal the sum of the earnings in all rounds of that match.
After the first match ends, we move to match 2. In this new match, you are
reshuﬄed randomly into THREE new groups of five members each. The project size in
your new group again starts out at 0. The match then proceeds the same way as match
1. After match 10, the experiment is over. Your total earnings for the experiment are
the sum of your earnings over all rounds and all matches.
We will now go through one practice match very slowly. During the practice match,
please do not hit any keys until I tell you, and when you are prompted by the computer
to enter information, please wait for me to tell you exactly what to enter. You are not
paid for this practice match.
[AUTHENTICATE CLIENTS]
Please double click on the icon on your desktop that says BP2. When the computer
prompts you for your name, type your First and Last name. Then click SUBMIT and
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wait for further instructions. You now see the first screen of the experiment on your
computer. It should look similar to this screen.
[SHOW SLIDE]
At the top left of the screen, you see your subject ID. In the top right you can see
that you have been assigned by the computer to a group of FIVE subjects, and assigned
a group member number: 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. This group assignment and your member
number stays the same for all rounds of this match, but will change across matches. It
is very important that you take careful note of your group member number.
As a visual aid, there is a graph on the left that shows exactly how project earnings
will depend on project size. The current size of the project is marked with a large dot
at the origin. If each member of your group decides to invest nothing this period, then
this will be the size that determines your project earnings at the end of the round.
You can use your mouse to move the curser along the curve to figure out what your
earnings will be for different levels of project investment. Also, if you type an amount in
the Project Investment box, the computer will compute and display the corresponding
project earnings for you just below the box. Take a minute to practice using your
curser to move along the curve, and typing in different possible investment levels. But
do not hit the confirm button yet.
At this time, go ahead and type in any investment decision you wish and hit the
confirm button. You are not paid for this practice match so it does not matter what
you enter.
[SHOW SLIDE]
This screen now summarizes the outcome of the round. Here you see your group
member number, and the end of round project size. The investment decisions of each
member are displayed in a table. Below the table are displayed your earnings for the
round, given the outcome. This marks the end of the round. The table with columns
in the bottom of your screen is the History panel and summarizes all of this important
information.
We now roll an eight-sided die to decide whether to move on to round 2. If the die
comes up a 1 or a 2, we do not go on to round 2, and the match is over. If the die comes
up 3 through 8, we continue to a second round of the match. [Roll die and do second
round unless it comes up a 1 or 2. Next say “the die roll was X, so we will continue
to the next round”. If X=(1 or 2) say “if this was a real match, there would be no
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second round. That would be the end of the match. However, we want to go through
one more practice round to make sure you are familiar with the computer interface.”]
[SHOW SLIDE]
In this second round, you keep the same group member number as in the first round,
and the members of your group all stay the same. Notice that the project investment
from round 1 carries over, so the round 2 beginning project size equals the project size
at the end of round 1. In this second round please follow the same instructions of the
first round. You can go ahead now. Since this is a practice match, we will not roll a
die after the second round, and the practice match will end. During the paid matches,
each match will continue until the die comes up a 1 or a 2.
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